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The past twenty years have seen unprecedented global efforts aimed at combating 
corrupt practices. With particular reference to criminalizing corruption, this chapter 
explores some of these efforts in four sections. Section 1 considers the development 
of the regional and other anti-corruption initiatives which culminated in the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) whilst Section 2 explores the 
scope of the substantive criminal offences contained in these conventions. Section 3 
discusses combating corruption offences involving the private sector and the liability 
of legal persons whilst Section 4 reviews the monitoring procedures contained in the 
anti-corruption conventions. The chapter concludes with a short overview. 
 
SECTION 1: THE DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION 
INITIATIVES 
i) The regional initiatives 
A. The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) 
The IACAC is the first regional anti-corruption instrument and was adopted by the 
Organization of American States (OAS) on 29 March 1996.2 In its Preamble, 
Member States recognize that corruption has international dimensions which require 
effective coordinated action and highlight their ‘deep concern’ over ‘the steadily 
increasing links between corruption and the proceeds generated by illicit narcotics 
trafficking which undermine and threaten legitimate commercial and financial 
activities, and society, at all levels’.3 
 The Convention adopts a holistic approach to addressing the problem with 
State Parties being required to i) take measures to prevent corruption; ii) criminalize 
                                            
1 Professor of Law, Buckingham Law School, Co-Director, University of Buckingham 
Centre for Extractive Energy Studies 
2 Barbados remains the only one of the 34 OAS member states that has not ratified 
the Convention 
3 Para 8 of the Preamble 
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‘acts of corruption’; iii) facilitate international cooperation and iv) facilitate asset 
recovery. These anti-corruption ‘pillars’ are reflected in other regional anti-corruption 
instruments as well as the UNCAC.   
 The IACAC does not define ‘corruption’ but rather requires State Parties to 
adopt legislative and other measures to establish as criminal offences a series of 
‘Acts of Corruption’ including active and passive bribery involving public officials,4 
abuse of office by a public official and the ‘fraudulent use or concealment of property’ 
derived from such offences.5 Provision is also made for a State Party to establish the 
offence of illicit enrichment ‘insofar as its laws permit’.6 
 As regards international cooperation, Article XIV requires States Parties to 
‘afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance by processing requests 
from authorities that, in conformity with their domestic laws, have the power to 
investigate or prosecute the acts of corruption described in the Convention, to obtain 
evidence and take other necessary action to facilitate legal proceedings and 
measures regarding the investigation or prosecution of acts of corruption’. States 
Parties also undertake to provide each other with the widest measure of mutual 
technical cooperation on the most effective ways and means of preventing, 
detecting, investigating, and punishing acts of corruption. To facilitate international 
cooperation, States Parties are required to maintain a Central Authority which is 
responsible for making and receiving requests for assistance and cooperation.7 
 The Convention itself does not include a monitoring mechanism but in 2001 
the Follow-up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention 
against Corruption (MESICIC) was established by the OAS General Assembly (see 
below).  
 
 
 
                                            
4 Unlike later conventions, it does not specifically address corruption in the private 
sector. 
5 Article VI. States also undertake to consider establishing a series of other 
corruption-related offences: see Article XI  
6 Article IX: see the discussion below 
7 Article XVIII 
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B. European initiatives 
Both the Council of Europe and European Union have take steps to combat 
corruption. The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (the CoE 
Convention) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
27 January 1999.8 In its Preamble, the member states of the Council of Europe and 
other signatory states recognize the need to pursue a common criminal policy aimed 
at protecting society against corruption and that an effective fight against corruption 
requires increased, rapid and well-functioning international cooperation in criminal 
matters.  
 Like the IACAC, the CoE Convention does not define ‘corruption’ but rather 
requires State Parties to criminalize bribery, trading in influence, money laundering, 
and what are referred to as ‘account offences’.9  As regards bribery, a feature of the 
Convention is that active and passive bribery are considered as separate offences 
with States Parties being required to criminalize, on the basis of a set of common 
elements, the bribery of domestic, foreign, and international public servants, 
members of legislatures, and judges, including prosecutors and holders of judicial 
office.10 As regards the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, Article 13 requires 
States Parties to adopt legislative and other measures to establish as criminal 
offences the money laundering offences referred to in Article 6(1) and (2) of the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of 
the Proceeds from Crime11 when the predicate offence consists of any of the 
convention offences. 
 Convention provisions are mandatory although a State may, at the time of 
signature or when depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or 
                                            
8 Note also the Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Article 1 of 
which requires State Parties to provide effective remedies for persons who have 
suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption. The Convention was adopted on 4 
November 1999. 
9 I.e. acts or omissions designed to commit, conceal or disguise the commission of 
any convention offence: see Article 14. 
10 Articles 2-11 
11 ETS No. 141. This is subject to the extent the State Party has not made a 
reservation or declaration with respect to those offences. 
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accession, make a reservation as regards specific Convention provisions. This 
reflects the intention of its drafters that Parties assume obligations under the 
Convention only to the extent consistent with their constitution and the fundamental 
principles of their legal system.12 
 Chapter IV of the Convention addresses international cooperation issues. In 
particular, Article 25 provides that for the purposes of the investigation and 
prosecution of Convention offences, States Parties agree to cooperate with one 
another to the widest extent possible ‘in accordance with the provisions of relevant 
international instruments on international cooperation in criminal matters’ or other 
arrangements. In practice there are a range of Council of Europe instruments 
already covering this area and therefore in essence the Chapter is a safety net 
designed to provide a basis for international cooperation in the absence of any other 
international treaty or agreement.13 Monitoring the implementation of the Convention 
is the responsibility of the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) (see below). 
 The European Union (EU) has made the fight against corruption one of its 
priorities. Thus Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union lists the preventing and 
combating of corruption and fraud as an objective towards creating a European area 
of freedom, security, and justice through, amongst other things, the ‘approximation’ 
of criminal laws of the Member States in order to fight corruption. In support of this 
objective, the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the European Union’s Financial 
Interests requires Member States to criminalize fraud affecting the EU’s financial 
interests whilst the First Protocol to the 1995 Convention specifically addresses 
corruption by or against national and Community officials ‘which damages or is likely 
to damage the European Communities’ financial interests’. The 1997 Convention on 
the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European Communities or 
Officials of Member States of the European Union14 also requires Member States to 
criminalize corrupt conduct involving officials of both the Community and Member 
States even if the conduct took place in its own territory or was instigated by one of 
their own nationals. There is currently no monitoring system in place. 
                                            
12 CoE Explanatory Report to the Criminal Law Convention, para 27 
13 In particular the CoE Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (ETS 
No 30) and the CoE Convention on Extradition (ETS No 24) 
14 The treaty entered into force on 28 September 1998. 
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C. African initiatives15 
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (the AU 
Convention) was adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the African 
Union on 12 July 2003 and came into force on 5 August 2006. As at 1 October 2013, 
it had been ratified by 31 of the 54 AU member states. Its twenty-eight articles also 
address the four anti-corruption ‘pillars’ i.e.  
 Effective corruption prevention measures 
 Strategies to facilitate the investigation and criminalisation of corruption and 
related offences 
 Effective international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption and related offences 
 Strategies for recovering the proceeds and instrumentalities of corruption. 
In particular, State Parties undertake to adopt the necessary legislative and other 
measures provisions to establish as offences a series of ‘acts of corruption and 
related offences’.16 These include active and passive bribery in both the public and 
private sectors, misuse of public office, trading in influence, unlawful diversion of 
state assets by public officials and the laundering of the proceeds of corruption-
related offences. Subject to the provisions of their domestic law, State Parties also 
undertake to establish the offence of illicit enrichment.   
 State Parties are required to ‘provide each other with the greatest possible 
technical cooperation and assistance in dealing immediately with requests’ for 
mutual legal assistance.17 To facilitate this process, State Parties are required to 
establish independent national authorities18 for the purpose of making and receiving 
requests for mutual legal assistance.19   
                                            
15 For a detailed examination of the African anti-corruption initiatives see John 
Hatchard Combating Corruption: Legal Approaches to Supporting Good Governance 
and Integrity in Africa 2014, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 
16 ‘Corruption’ means ‘the acts and practices including related offences proscribed in 
this Convention’: see Article 1 
17 Article 18. The inclusion of the word ‘immediately’ is unique to this anti-corruption 
convention and, given the practical problems often associated with mutual legal 
assistance requests, is a somewhat unrealistic requirement. 
18 Widely referred to as ‘Central Authorities’. 
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 A follow-up mechanism is provided for through the work of the Advisory Board 
on Corruption within the African Union which was established in 2009 (see below). 
 The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
came into force on 6 July 2005 and thus pre-dates the AU Convention.20 Whilst 
lacking in detail, its twenty-two articles again cover the four anti-corruption ‘pillars’. 
States Parties are required to adopt the necessary legislative and other measures to 
establish as criminal offences a series of ‘Acts of Corruption’ which, in essence, are 
almost identical to those in the AU Convention.21 State Parties are required to report 
every two years to the Committee of State Parties on the progress made in the 
implementation of the Protocol.  
 
D. Asia-Pacific initiatives 
The Asia-Pacific has no binding regional anti-corruption instrument. However 28 
jurisdictions in the region have formally endorsed the Asia Development 
Bank/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific which was launched in 2000. The current 
strategic objective of the Initiative is to support its member countries in implementing 
the international anti-corruption standards as set forth in the UNCAC and the OECD 
anti-bribery convention (see below). Accordingly in the Preamble to the Initiative, 
governments ‘concur’ in taking ‘concrete and meaningful priority steps’ to deter, 
prevent, and combat corruption at all levels. Developing regional cooperation and 
adopting a holistic and international approach are seen as critical strategies in this 
regard.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
19 Article 20 
20 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprises fifteen states: 
Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
21 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol on the 
Fight against Corruption of the Economic Community of West African States was 
signed in December 2001 but still awaits ratification. 
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ii) Other key instruments 
A. The Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (The OECD anti-bribery convention) 
This Convention entered into force on 15 February 1999 and as of 1 October 2013, 
had been ratified by forty states worldwide.22 Article 1 requires each State Party to 
establish the offence of the bribery of a foreign public official ‘in order to obtain or 
retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international 
business’. On the face of it, the Convention is of limited scope in that it focuses 
solely on active bribery and related accounting offences. However, as Nicholls et al 
point out, its importance lies in the fact that the State Parties to the Convention are 
home to just about all the major multinational/international companies. Thus the 
steps taken by them to counter the bribery of foreign public officials by companies 
based in their jurisdiction can have a direct effect on international trade generally and 
on good governance in specific trading partners in particular. In addition, they note 
that the OECD Convention has also influenced the wording of the UNCAC.23 
 A key feature of the Convention is its effective and systematic monitoring 
program undertaken by the Working Group on Bribery (see below). 
 
B. UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) 
The Palermo Convention is the first global instrument to address corruption. It came 
into force on 29 September 2003 and as at 1 October 2013 had been ratified by 178 
State Parties. It contains several provisions directly relating to corruption. Firstly, 
Article 8(1) requires State Parties to adopt the necessary legislative and other 
measures to establish bribery involving public officials as a criminal offence. States 
Parties are also to consider criminalizing other forms of corruption, including the 
                                            
22 See further <http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf> accessed 1 October 2013 
23 Colin Nicholls, Tim Daniel, Alan Bacarese and John Hatchard Corruption and 
Misuse of Public Office 2nd edition, 2011, Oxford University Press, Oxford, para 
13.22 (hereinafter Nicholls et al).  
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bribery of foreign public officials and of international civil servants.24 Secondly, in 
recognition of the fact that organized criminal groups may use corrupt practices to 
facilitate their activities, Article 9(1) requires each State Party ‘to the extent 
appropriate and consistent with its legal system, [to] adopt legislative, administrative 
or other effective measures to promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish 
the corruption of public officials’.25 In addition, each State Party is required to take 
measures ‘to ensure effective action by its authorities in the prevention, detection 
and punishment of corruption of public officials, including providing authorities with 
adequate independence to deter the exertion of inappropriate influence on their 
actions’.26   
 
iii) The United Nations Convention Against Corruption  
Whilst the Palermo Convention was a significant step forward, the desire for a global, 
comprehensive international legal instrument through which to combat corruption in 
both the public and private sectors led to the development of the UNCAC. This 
entered into force on 14 December 2005 and as at 1 October 2013 had been ratified 
by 167 State Parties.  
 The Convention seeks to build upon the earlier multilateral anti-corruption 
instruments which it notes ‘with appreciation’. In the Preamble, State Parties also 
highlight the ‘links between corruption and other forms of crime, in particular 
organized crime and economic crime, including money laundering’. In structure the 
UNCAC comprises four operative chapters which again reflect the four ‘pillars’ in the 
fight against corruption: 1) Prevention (Chapter II); 2) Criminalization and law 
                                            
24 Article 8(3) also requires each State Party to adopt such measures as may be 
necessary to establish as a criminal offence participation as an accomplice in an 
offence established in accordance with Article 8. 
25 For the purposes of Article 9 and Article 8(1) a ‘public official’ means ‘a public 
official or a person who provides a public service as defined in the domestic law and 
as applied in the criminal law of the State Party in which the person in question 
performs that function’: Article 8(4). 
26 Article 9(2) 
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enforcement (Chapter III); 3) International cooperation (Chapter IV); and 4) Asset 
recovery (Chapter V).27  
 The range of criminal offences contained in the UNCAC essentially mirrors 
those in the regional anti-corruption instruments and these are considered in the next 
section. 
 A notable feature of UNCAC is its extensive and detailed provisions relating to 
international cooperation in criminal matters. These are particularly significant in that 
law enforcement is strictly territorial in nature. Thus where a corruption or other 
criminal investigation or prosecution involves a transnational element, a state (the 
requesting state) must make a formal mutual legal assistance request to another 
state (the requested state) for assistance in gathering evidence or information that is 
held in the requested state.28 It is then up to the requested state to decide whether it 
is willing and/or able to provide the assistance requested. The need for effective 
MLA arrangements is a cornerstone of transnational cooperation in criminal matters 
and this is reflected in Article 46. This requires State Parties to ‘afford one another 
the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and 
judicial proceedings’ in relation to convention offences. Article 46 then goes on to set 
out detailed provisions relating to the MLA arrangements that each State Party is 
required to have in place. Further, State Parties must also ‘cooperate closely with 
one another, consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative 
systems, to enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the 
[Convention] offences...’.29  
Chapter VII sets out ‘Mechanisms for Implementation’ with Article 63 establishing a 
review process through the Conference of the State Parties to the Convention (see 
below).  
  
 
                                            
27 Chapter I contains ‘General Provisions’ whilst Chapter VI addresses technical 
assistance and information exchange. 
28 Strictly speaking a formal mutual legal assistance request is only required where the requested 
state is being asked to exercise a coercive powers or obtain a court order: see further Hatchard 
(2014) pp. 303-317. 
29 Article 48 
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SECTION 2: THE CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION 
CONVENTIONS  
This section provides an overview of the substantive criminal offences contained in 
the anti-corruption instruments with particular reference to the provisions of the 
UNCAC. 
i) Bribery offences 
The bribery offences in the anti-corruption conventions cover much the same 
ground. For example, Article 15 of UNCAC requires each State Party to adopt such 
legislative and other measures30 as may be necessary to establish offences relating 
to the bribery of public officials. Article 15(a) deals with ‘active bribery’, i.e.:  
‘The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, 
in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her 
official duties’. 
 Paragraph (b) deals with ‘passive bribery’, the elements of the offence being a 
‘mirror image’ of paragraph (a). 
 Article 16(1) of the UNCAC also requires State Parties to criminalize the 
bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organisations. 
The elements of the offence essentially follow those in Article 15(a). As noted earlier, 
these key provisions largely reflect those in the OECD anti-bribery convention.     
 
Public officials 
 Reflecting the approach in all the anti-corruption instruments, the term ‘public 
official’ in the UNCAC is widely defined and refers to any person holding a 
legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office31 of a State Party, whether 
                                            
30 The reference to ‘other’ measures is not intended to require or permit 
criminalisation without legislation. Such measures are additional to, and presuppose 
the existence of, legislation: UNCAC Legislative Guide, paragraph 15. 
31 Paragraph 3 of the interpretative notes indicate that the term ‘office’ is understood 
to encompass offices at all levels and subdivisions of government from national to 
local. In States where sub-national governmental units (for example, provincial, 
municipal and local) of a self-governing nature exist, including States where such 
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appointed or elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, 
irrespective of that person’s seniority.32 It also covers any other person who performs 
a public function, including for a public agency or public enterprise, or provides a 
public service, as defined in the domestic law of the State Party. Paragraph 2 of the 
Interpretative Notes for the official records of the negotiation of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (the interpretative notes)33 indicate that the word 
‘executive’ is understood to encompass the military branch, where appropriate. 
 A ‘foreign public official’ means ‘any person holding a legislative, executive, 
administrative or judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; 
and any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a 
public agency or public enterprise’. The ‘foreign country’ need not be a State Party to 
the UNCAC. An ‘official of a public international organization’ means ‘an international 
civil servant or any person who is authorized by such an organization to act on 
behalf of that organization’.34 However, according to paragraph 23 of the 
Interpretative Notes this:  
‘… is not intended to affect any immunities that foreign public officials or 
officials of public international organizations may enjoy in accordance with 
international law. The States Parties noted the relevance of immunities in this 
context and encourage public international organizations to waive such 
immunities in appropriate cases’. 
 
‘Undue advantage’ 
The term ‘undue advantage’ appears in several anti-corruption instruments and both 
the Legislative Guide to the UNCAC and the CoE Explanatory Report on the criminal 
law convention provide some assistance as to its meaning. The Legislative Guide 
indicates that an undue advantage may be something tangible or intangible, whether 
                                                                                                                                       
bodies are not deemed to form a part of the State, ‘office’ may be understood by the 
States concerned to encompass those levels also. 
32 Paragraph 4 of the Interpretative Notes indicates that each State Party shall 
determine who is a ‘public official’ for the purposes of this paragraph and how each 
of those categories is applied. 
33 Doc A/58/422/Add.1 
34 Article 2 
12 
 
pecuniary or non-pecuniary and that it does not have to be given immediately or 
directly to a public official of the State. However, the undue advantage or bribe must 
be linked to the official’s duties. The CoE Explanatory Report also indicates that the 
undue advantage will generally be of an economic nature, the essence of the offence 
being that a person is, or would be, placed in a better position than that prior to the 
offence and that the public official was not entitled to the benefit. Such advantages 
might consist of, for example, holidays, loans, food and drink, or better career 
prospects.35 The Explanatory Report also suggests that the word ‘undue’ should be 
interpreted as something that the recipient is not lawfully entitled to accept or 
receive. It adds that ‘[f ]or the drafters of the Convention, the adjective “undue” aims 
at excluding advantages permitted by the law or administrative rules as well as 
minimum gifts, gifts of very low value or socially acceptable gifts’.36  
 
Intention   
 The intention must be not only to promise, offer or give an undue advantage 
but also with the ulterior intent of influencing the conduct of the public official.  In this 
context, intention may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.37  
 Depending on the factual situation, the promise or offering of a bribe may 
constitute an attempt to bribe. This is emphasized in Article 27 of the UNCAC where 
each State Party, in accordance with its domestic law, has an option to establish as 
a criminal offence any attempt to commit a Convention offence.  
 
ii) Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public 
official  
The scope of the anti-corruption conventions is reflected in the fact that they require 
state parties need to criminalize the theft of state property by public officials:38 
conduct that is not necessarily regarded as constituting ‘corruption’. For example 
Article 17 of the UNCAC provides:  
                                            
35 See para 37 
36 See para 38 
37 Article 28 
38 See, for example, the ‘grand corruption’ cases discussed in Nicholls paras 8.118 
et seq 
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‘Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally, the 
embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion by a public official for his 
or her benefit or for the benefit of another person or entity, of any property, 
public or private funds or securities or any other thing of value entrusted to the 
public official by virtue of his or her position’.  
At least as regards common law jurisdictions, ‘embezzlement, misappropriation or 
other diversion of property’ is often covered by the single offence of theft by a public 
servant or fraud. However paragraph 30 of the Interpretative Notes explains that ‘the 
term “diversion” is understood in some countries as separate from “embezzlement” 
and “misappropriation”, while in others “diversion” is intended to be covered by or is 
synonymous with those terms'.  
 
iii) Trading in influence 
The elements of this offence are essentially the same as Articles 15 and 16 of 
UNCAC save for the fact that the offence involves the use of real or supposed 
influence in order to obtain an undue advantage for a third person from an 
administration or public authority of the State Party. The mens rea for the offence is 
intention. As paragraph 64 of the CoE Explanatory Report puts it:  
`criminalizing trading in influence seeks to reach the close circle of the official 
or the political party to which s/he belongs and to tackle the corrupt behaviour 
of those persons who are in the neighbourhood of power and try to obtain 
advantages from their situation, contributing to the atmosphere of corruption'.  
Thus, unlike bribery, the influence peddlers are ‘outsiders’ who cannot take decisions 
themselves but misuse their real or alleged influence on other persons. The scope of 
the offence remains controversial in that there are concerns that it unduly limits the 
lobbying of public officials. However, paragraph 65 of the Explanatory Report 
stresses that ‘the acknowledged forms of lobbying do not fall under the notion of 
“improper” influence which must contain a corrupt intent by the influence peddler’. 
 
iv) Abuse of functions 
Article 19 of the UNCAC provides that:  
‘Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures 
as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed 
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intentionally, the abuse of functions or position, that is, the performance of or 
failure to perform an act, in violation of laws, by a public official in the 
discharge of his or her functions, for the purpose of obtaining an undue 
advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity’.  
In many common law countries, such conduct falls within the offence of ‘misconduct 
in a public office’39 and, as the Interpretative Notes to UNCAC indicate, the Article 19 
offence encompasses a range of conduct.40 This includes firstly, the abuse of public 
office in circumstances where this goes beyond the need for disciplinary action: for 
example where a public official awards a lucrative government contract to a 
company of which s/he is a secret beneficiary or arranges for the sale of government 
land to a company owned or controlled by his/her family at a price far below the 
market value.41  
 Secondly a single charge may reflect a course of conduct or address a 
situation where no financial reward is involved. For example, in Sin Kam Wah v 
HKSAR42 the accused, a senior police officer, was in command of a department 
responsible for investigating vice offences. He was convicted on three charges of 
misconduct in that on several occasions he had been provided with prostitutes by the 
owner of several night clubs in return for protection from police investigation. Thirdly 
it can address the important contemporary problem of the improper disclosure by a 
public official of classified or privileged information.43 A charge of conspiracy is also 
available against those seeking to cause public officials to abuse their powers. 
 
v) Illicit enrichment 
The offence of illicit enrichment applies where there is a ‘significant increase in the 
assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain in relation to his or 
                                            
39 For a detailed analysis of this offence see John Hatchard ‘Combating corruption: 
some reflections on the use of the offence and the tort of misconduct/misfeasance in 
a public office’ (2012) 24 Denning LJ 65-88  
40 A/58/422/Add.1, para. 31 
41 See, for example the facts of Marin & Coye v Attorney General of Belize [2011] 
CCJ 9 (Caribbean Court of Justice). 
42 [2005] 2 HKLRD 375 
43 See, for example R v W [2009] EWCA Crim 2219 
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her income’.44 Thus once the prosecution has proved that the accused is a public 
official and has enjoyed a ‘significant increase’ in his or her assets, that person has 
the legal burden of providing a reasonable explanation to the court as to how the 
assets were acquired or face conviction.  
 In Attorney General v Hui Kin-hong45 the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong 
recognized the effectiveness of the illicit enrichment offence in the fight against 
corruption especially in view of the ‘notorious evidential difficulty’ in proving that a 
public official had solicited or accepted a bribe and the offence is found in the 
criminal laws of many states.46 However due to constitutional issues in some 
countries relating to the protection of the presumption of innocence this is not a 
mandatory provision.47 Even so, evidence of ‘illicit enrichment’ may form the basis for 
prosecuting public officials for tax offences or failing to declare their assets (see 
below).  
 
vi) Accounting and other offences and prosecutorial policy 
Whilst convictions on corruption or bribery charges make excellent headlines, in 
practice prosecutors often face significant difficulties in proving such allegations 
particularly when the cases involve powerful political figures and/or corporate 
entities.  Thus determining the appropriate charge in such cases is often the key to a 
successful prosecution: for example a charge of illicit enrichment against a senior 
public official will remove the necessity for the prosecution to prove any specific 
instance of bribe-taking, although as noted above, this may fall foul of constitutional 
right to fair trial provisions. Yet such payments almost inevitably involve the 
commission of a range of separate accounting and tax evasion offences as well as 
                                            
44 Article 20 UNCAC 
45 [1995] 1 HKCLR 227 
46 See generally Lindy Muzila et al On the Take: Criminalising Illicit Enrichment to 
Fight Corruption 2012 World Bank, Washington  
47 For example, Canada has an express understanding not to implement such a 
provision as ‘the offence contemplated by Article IX [of IACAC] would be contrary to 
the presumption of innocence guaranteed by Canada’s Constitution...’. See 
<http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html> accessed 1 October 2013. 
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the offence of failing to declare assets.48 This point is reflected in several anti-
corruption conventions in which State Parties are required establish a series of 
accounting offences relating both to the public and private sectors.49 In addition, the 
threat of debarment following a conviction for a corruption-related offence may 
encourage corporations to do ‘deals’ by agreeing to plead guilty to accountancy and 
other related offences (see below). 
 Similarly the effectiveness of the offence of the failure to declare assets is 
neatly illustrated by the case of Solomon Alamieyeseigha, was Governor of Bayelsa 
State in Nigeria from 1999 to 2005. During this period he had acquired assets 
exceeding £10 million largely through the theft of public funds or from bribes yet in 
2007 he pleaded guilty to six charges of making false declarations of assets and 
caused two of his off-shore companies to plead guilty to money laundering.50  
  
vii) Money-laundering 
Corruption-related offences and money laundering are often inextricably interlinked. 
Indeed the importance of preventing those involved in corrupt practices from 
enjoying their proceeds of crime is reflected in the fact that all the anti-corruption 
conventions require State Parties to establish a series of money laundering offences.  
 Of particular significance is the fact that the commission of a money 
laundering offence often includes a transnational element and thus encourages the 
prosecution of launderers and their ‘allies’ in other states. This is particularly relevant 
in seeking to combat the laundering of the proceeds of ‘grand corruption’ by public 
                                            
48 A classic case is that of Frederick Chiluba, the former President of Zambia. In a 
highly-charged trial that attracted international attention he was acquitted on several 
counts of theft by public servant having given testimony that the money had been 
given to him by political well-wishers. Whatever the truth, the fact was that he 
admitted that he had not declared this income for either tax purposes or included 
them as part of his asset and income declaration and this would have founded 
criminal liability without more: See The People v Chiluba (2009, unreported, copy in 
the possession of the author, especially page J237).   
49 See, for example, Article 12(3) UNCAC 
50 See Federal Republic of Nigeria v Santolina Investment Corp and Others [2007] 
EWHC 3053 
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officials (often referred to as ‘politically exposed persons (PEPs)) in circumstances 
where a criminal prosecution in their home state is unlikely.51 For example, 
seemingly due to considerable ongoing political support, James Ibori, the former 
Governor of Delta State in Nigeria, was not prosecuted successfully in Nigeria 
although there was considerable evidence of corrupt practices on his part. However, 
in 2012 he was convicted in a London court of conspiracy to defraud and money 
laundering involving sums totally almost £50 million.  The case is interesting in that it 
demonstrates that given the ‘transnational political will’ and effective international 
cooperation arrangements (particularly by way of mutual legal assistance), other 
states are able to prosecute foreign PEPs successfully and turn their perceived ‘safe 
haven’ for the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, into a prison cell. It also 
highlights that whilst PEPs may enjoy constitutional immunity52 or political protection 
in their home state, with the exception of serving heads of state, such persons 
remain vulnerable to prosecution abroad, as do those who assist them. 
 
SECTION 3: OFFENCES CONCERNING THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE 
LIABILITY OF LEGAL PERSONS 
i) The bribery of foreign public officials and the threat of debarment 
Effective national and transnational efforts are needed to combat the bribery of 
foreign public officials and, as noted above, the OECD anti-bribery convention leads 
the way in this regard. The challenge of doing so is starkly illustrated by the Siemens 
case in which the activities of the giant German-based engineering firm were 
described as being ‘unprecedented in scale and geographic reach and which 
involved more than US$1.4 billion in bribes to government officials in Asia, Africa, 
Europe, the Middle East and the Americas’.53 However, the issue is not restricted to 
the bribery of foreign public officials for as the Transparency International Bribe 
                                            
51 According to Glossary to the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012, 
PEPs are ‘individuals who have been entrusted ... with prominent public functions’. 
52 Such as Nigerian state governors: see Article 308 Constitution of Nigeria 1999 
53 Department of Justice press release, 15 December 2008: available at 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html> accessed 1 July 
2013 
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Payers Index 2011 indicates, bribery is just as prevalent between companies across 
different sectors as it is between firms and public officials.54     
 The impact of the OECD convention is highlighted by the fact that all State 
Parties have introduced legislation outlawing the bribery of foreign public officials. In 
this regard the United States has taken the lead through the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA) which criminalises foreign bribery as well as containing a 
series of accounting provisions.55 As well as this, the FCPA contains wide 
jurisdictional provisions which enable the two enforcement agencies, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to impose 
severe penalties on companies, some of which have only a minimal link with the 
United States.  As a result, it is commonplace for prosecutors to reach an agreement 
whereby the defendant company pleads guilty to a FCPA accounting offence and 
agrees to pay a substantial fine so as to avoid a corruption conviction. For example, 
following its admission of involvement in bribery noted earlier, in 2008 Siemens 
agreed to plead guilty to a violation of the FCPA's accounting provisions,56 to pay 
record fines in the United States and to be monitored to ensure future compliance 
with anti-bribery laws.57  
The case also highlights another key weapon in the fight against transnational 
bribery in the corporate sector for the threat of debarment proceedings following a 
criminal conviction for a corruption offence may persuade companies, even the most 
powerful to do a ‘deal’ with prosecutors. Debarment (also known as ‘blacklisting’ or 
‘exclusion’) is the mechanism through which a company or individual is prevented 
from tendering for, or participating in, a project(s) for a specific reason, such as 
previous involvement in corrupt practices. In some cases, debarment is discretionary 
                                            
54 TI Bribe Payers Index 2011 page 12: Available at 
<http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi2011/in_detail/> accessed 1 July 2013 
55 Indeed the FCPA pre-dates the OECD anti-bribery convention by many years: for 
a detailed account of the legislation see Nicholls et al, Chapter 16 
56 Under the ‘books and records’ provisions under section 78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(5), 
and 78ff(a). It also pleaded guilty to a violation of the FCPA's internal control 
provisions under section 78m(b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a). 
57 Siemens is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and accordingly it is subject to 
the FCPA.  
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(for example, the World Bank) in others, (for example under the European Union 
Procurement Directives), a purchasing body must exclude from tendering any 
company that has been convicted of corruption.58 Debarment systems operate at the 
national level in several countries, including in the United States under the FCPA. 
 
ii) The liability of legal persons 
All the anti-corruption instruments require State Parties to address the liability 
of legal persons. However establishing the criminal liability of a legal person is 
potentially difficult. For many common law jurisdictions, corporate criminal liability is 
restricted to acts of the ‘directing’ or ‘controlling’ minds of the corporation who carry 
out the functions of management and speak and act as the ‘company’.59 For civil law 
jurisdictions, establishing corporate criminal liability at all has proved problematic and 
to do so would require a change in the entire basis of their domestic law.60 As a 
result, Article 26 of UNCAC, for example, requires State Parties to ‘adopt such 
measures as may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the 
liability of legal persons’ for convention offences and adds that ‘the liability of legal 
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative’. However, whatever type of ‘liability’ 
is imposed, State Parties must ensure that legal persons are subject to ‘effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary 
sanctions’.61   
The CoE Convention contains similar, albeit more detailed, provisions regarding 
legal persons. Article 18(1) requires States Parties to adopt such legislative and 
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that legal persons can be held liable 
for active bribery, trading in influence, and money laundering where those offences 
                                            
58 See Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 31 March 2004. See further John Hatchard ‘Recent developments in 
combating the bribery of foreign public officials: A cause for optimism?’ (2007) 85 
University of Detroit-Mercy Law Review 1 
59 See Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127 
60 Commentary 20 to the OECD anti-bribery convention states that ‘in the event that, 
under the legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal 
persons, that Party shall not be required to establish such criminal responsibility’. 
61 Article 16(4) 
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were committed for the corporation’s benefit by a natural person with a ‘leading 
position’ within the legal person based on: 
 a power of representation of the legal person; or 
 an authority to take decisions on behalf of the legal person; or 
 an authority to exercise control within the legal person  
as well as for involvement of such a natural person as perpetrator, accessory, or 
instigator in the above-mentioned offences. Again, this does not impose any 
obligation to establish criminal liability for legal persons.  
However, Article 18(2) of the CoE convention goes further and addresses 
liability for a failure to put in place corruption preventive measures by legal persons. 
Thus States Parties are required to take the necessary steps to ensure that a legal 
person can be held liable ‘where the lack of supervision or control by a natural 
person has made possible the commission of the corruption offences mentioned in 
[Article 18(1)] for the benefit of that legal person by a natural person under its 
authority’. This approach is reflected, for example in section 7 of the Bribery Act 
2010 (UK) which makes it an offence for a ‘relevant commercial organization’ to fail 
to prevent bribery by a person associated with it’.62 
 
SECTION 4: MONITORING PROCEDURES 
A notable feature of several anti-corruption conventions is the provision for some 
form of a ‘monitoring’ system. Thus one the key strengths of the OECD anti-bribery 
convention is its program of systematic monitoring by way of peer review of state 
compliance which is undertaken by the Working Group on Bribery (WGB). This 
comprises a country visit by examiners from different OECD countries whose task is 
to assess state compliance with particular aspects of the convention. Their report is 
presented to the WGB in plenary and the report and recommendations for action are 
                                            
62 Section 7(1). The offence only applies where the bribery has been committed with 
intent to obtain or retain business or a business advantage for the organization’s 
benefit. It is an offence of strict liability, but is subject to the defence that the 
organization had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons associated with it 
from committing bribery: see further Nicholls para 4.88 et seq  
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then made public.63 There is also provision for a follow-up process to assess state 
compliance with the recommendations. For example, the response of the WGB to 
UK’s decision not to proceed with an investigation into allegations of bribery 
concerning BAe Systems acquiring of multi-billion dollar arms contracts with Saudi 
Arabia was to publicly criticize its action and to conduct a detailed supplementary 
review on the UK’s compliance with its convention obligations.64    
 Similarly, under the CoE convention, the Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO) was established by the Council of Ministers with the aim of improving ‘the 
capacity of its members to fight corruption by following up, through a dynamic 
process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure, compliance with their undertakings’ 
in the fight against corruption.65 Again, a key feature of the process is the systematic 
verification of the action taken by each of the 49 CoE member States as regards the 
implementation of the recommendations including being required to submit a 
Situation Report on the measures taken to implement those recommendations.66  
 A less confrontational approach is adopted in the Follow-up Mechanism of the 
Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) whose objective is to 
promote the implementation of the IACAC and facilitate harmonization of national 
anti-corruption legislation throughout the hemisphere. MESICIC also seeks to 
facilitate technical cooperation activities and the exchange of information, 
experiences, and best practices. A Committee of Experts comprises members 
designated by each State Party reviews the implementation of the convention by 
States Parties through a system of ‘rounds’ which reviews progress made by state 
parties focus on  particular aspects of the Convention. The reports of the Committee 
are readily available and are an invaluable source of information about individual 
                                            
63 Reports can be found on the OECD’s website: <http://www.oecd.org/bribery> 
accessed 1 October 2013. 
64 See the WGB Phase 2 bis report available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/41515077.pdf> 
accessed 1 October 2013. The case is explored in detail in Nicholls et al at paras 
7.208 et seq 
65 Article 1, Statute of GRECO 
66 See <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/> accessed 1 October 
2013 
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state compliance with the convention. Of course, whilst this may usefully indicate the 
progress being made in convention compliance, the danger is that such a process 
will be little more than self-serving and contain little critical analysis.  
 The African Union convention provides for an Advisory Board on Corruption 
within the African Union67 whose mandate is limited to promoting and encouraging 
the adoption of anti-corruption measures and the collection and dissemination of 
information amongst member states. 
 As regards the UNCAC, a Conference of the States Parties to the Convention 
(CoSP) was established to improve the capacity of and cooperation between States 
Parties to achieve the objectives set forth in the Convention and to promote and 
review its implementation.68 Through ratifying the Convention, each State Party 
agrees to take the necessary measures, including legislative and administrative 
measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to 
ensure the implementation of its obligations under the Convention.69 Critically the 
Mechanism is to be non-intrusive, producing no form of ranking with each State 
Party merely being required to provide information to the Conference on its 
compliance and implementation of the convention. Provision is made for a review of 
each State Party by two other State Parties with a report from the reviewers on good 
practice and challenges in convention implementation being produced. Such reports 
are to remain confidential although executive summaries are made public.70     
 
OVERVIEW 
The development of the anti-corruption conventions represents a significant 
development in the fight against corruption both at the national and transnational 
                                            
67 Article 22(1) 
68 See Article 63(1) 
69 Article 65(1). The review mechanism was adopted by the CoSP in Resolution 3/1 
70 Full details of the work of the CoSP are available on the website of the UN Office 
for Drugs and Crime: see 
 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html?ref=menuside> accessed 1 
October 2013. The executive summaries are available at 
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/country-profile/index.html> accessed 
1 October 2013 
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level. However the discussion calls for some general comments and has highlighted 
several challenges: 
i) Whilst the regional conventions and the UNCAC require State Parties to take a 
holistic approach to combating corruption, the majority of their substantive provisions 
focus on the criminalization and international cooperation pillars. 
ii) The scope of ‘corruption’ goes well beyond the payment or receipt of bribes and 
the anti-corruption conventions require State Parties either to ‘adopt’ or to ‘consider 
adopting’ a wide range of criminal offences which can be best described as ‘acts of 
corruption and other related offences’. 
iii) There remains a considerable challenge in seeking to prove the bribery/corruption 
offence, especially in that this is often a ‘victimless’ crime.71 It is therefore vital that in 
determining the appropriate charges, prosecutors consider using the whole range of 
‘corruption and other related offences’. Thus, for example, rather than seeking to 
prove a bribery offence involving senior public officials, a charge of illicit enrichment 
may be a viable alternative as this does not require proof of any specific bribe-taking. 
Where constitutional problems prevent the use of this offence, accounting and tax 
offences may offer the most realistic prospect of conviction. Thus prosecutorial policy 
is key to making the criminal law provisions ‘work’ in practice.  
iv) The need for the political will to combat corruption and the fact that those called 
upon to make the necessary decisions to do so are often the very actors who benefit 
most from the status quo,72 means that taking action at the national level is often 
problematic. It follows that also addressing the issue from a transnational 
perspective is vital. This means that other State Parties must fulfil their convention 
obligations and take steps to prosecute those who seek to bribe foreign public 
officials. Similarly, states must display a willingness to prosecute all those involved in 
the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, including the financial institutions and 
‘gatekeepers’73 who facilitate the process as well as taking active steps to assist 
                                            
71 Of course, the victims are those who suffer direct or indirect harm as a result of the 
illegal bargain.  
72 Letitia Lawson ‘The politics of anti-corruption reform in Africa’ (2009) 47(1) Journal 
of African Law 73 at 74 
73 Such as legal practitioners, real estate agents and accountants  
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victim states recover the proceeds of corruption no matter where in the world they 
are located. 
v) The prospect of a legal person being debarred from involvement in lucrative 
contracts if convicted of a corruption offence means that the threat of a criminal 
prosecution for such an offence represents a powerful incentive for the doing of 
‘deals’ with prosecutors in which there is an admission of liability for a ‘non-
corruption’ offence in return for the dropping of the corruption charges. Whilst the 
transparency of such ‘deals’ is questionable, they ensure that the offending 
enterprise suffers financial and reputational damage whilst removing the often 
challenging task of mounting a successful bribery prosecution.  
vi) In order to facilitate investigations, prosecutions and the recovery of the proceeds 
of corruption, the anti-corruption conventions rightly emphasises the need for all 
states to have in place effective international cooperation mechanisms. 
vii) A striking feature of the UNCAC and OECD conventions in particular is the 
recognition that the private sector plays a key role in combating corruption. Yet the 
challenge of dealing with the criminal liability of legal persons remains. As regards 
many common law jurisdictions, this calls for a re-examination of the basis of 
corporate criminal liability itself. In addition, placing legal obligations on corporate 
entities and their senior management to take active steps to put in place effective 
corruption preventive measures is a promising development.    
viii) The monitoring of state compliance with their convention obligations is a 
significant feature of the anti-corruption conventions. The question of how ‘intrusive’ 
such monitoring can be varies markedly and the remit of the CoSP, in particular, 
demonstrates the determination on the part of some states to avoid any kind of 
ranking or assessment of their compliance with those obligations.   
ix) Above all, the transnational nature of many corruption-related offences 
emphasises the need for states worldwide to implement fully their obligations under 
the anti-corruption conventions. 
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